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BAR BRIEFS

exactitude is not attainable in social legislation, that, accordingly,
unless the individual right is gravely invaded the social interest must
prevail, that the criterion of constitutionality must be found. It is
difficult not to feel that Mr. Justice Holmes' long emphasis upon this
attitude has humanized the jurisprudence of the United States.
"In the proud preface to Montesquieu's last work there are certain
words than which none are more fitting to Mr. Justice Holmes' labors.
'When I have seen,' wrote Montesquieu, 'what so many great men in
France, England and Germany have written before me, I have been
lost in admiration, but without losing my courage; I, too, am a painter,
I have said with Correggio.' That, as I think, has been the secret of
Mr. Justice Holmes' preeminence in his time. It is 'not only that he
has had the scholar's breadth of knowledge. It is not merely, either,
that he has realized how the facts call the judge, and especially, perhaps, the American judge, to the tasks of statesmanship. Both these
qualities he has had in full measure. But, above all, he has had the
great artist's power of penetrating with the vision of genius to the
essential, of making the bridge between the little fact of daily life
and the sweeping generalization by which a state rises to the consciousness of its purpose. He has done it with singular felicity of expression,
and with unvarying integrity of mind. We can only be humbly grateful
in the presence of so rare and so distinguished an achievement."
REGULATION OF AGENTS' COMMISSIONSFOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
By the narrow margin of five to four the Supreme Court of the
U. S. has just determined the validity of a New Jersey statute
forbidding fire insurance companies to allow any agent a commission
in excess of a reasonable amount or to allow any local agent a
commission in excess of that allowed to other agents on similar risks.
The agreement between the company and the agent was for "the
reasonable worth of the agent's services," which he contended was
25%. The defense was the statute and the fact that other local agents
received 20%. Justice Brandeis, voicing the judgment of the majority, said: "The business of insurance is so far affected with a
public interest that the State may regulate the rates; . . . and like-

wise the relations of those engaged in the business... The agent's
compensation, being a percentage of the premium, bears a direct relation
to the rate charged the insured. The percentage commonly allowed
is so large that it is a vital element in the rate structure and may
seriously affect the adequacy of the rate. Excessive commissions may
result in an unreasonably high rate level or in impairment of the
financial stability of the insurer. It was stated at the bar that the
commission on some classes of insurance is as high as thirty-five per
cent. Moreover, lack of a uniform scale of commissions allowed
local agents for the same service may encourage unfair discrimination
among policy holders by facilitating the forbidden practice of rebating.
In the field of life insurance, such evils led long ago to legislative
limitation of agents' commissions. The statute here questioned deals
with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are
asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff
of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition
the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption
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of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. It does not appear
upon the face of the statute, or from any facts of which the court
must take judicial notice, that in New Jersey evils did not exist in
the business of fire insurance for which this statutory provision was
an appropriate remedy. The action of the legislature and of the
highest court of the State indicates that such evils did exist. The
record is barren of any allegation of fact tending to show unreasonableness."
The dissent was expressed by Justice Butler for himself and
Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and Sutherland: "Abstractly
stated, the principal paid 'A' commissions at the rate of 20% ; therefore, it has been held solely because of the Act nothing above 20%
can be recovered by 'B', who claims under a contract fair on its face
and not expressly inhibited, which definitely provides for reasonable
compensation. It cannot rightly be said that the burden of establishing any underlying disputable fact rests upon the appellant before it
can successfully challenge the validity of the questioned enactment.
This is not a proceeding to enjoin enforcement of a statute because
of alleged discrimination or other circumstance, the existence of which
requires consideration of facts not known to the court. Opinions in
cases of that character are not in point. The court below ruled, in
effect, that without regard to any evidence which might be presented
the complainant, although relying upon a contract fair upon its face,
could recover nothing above the rate allowed to another agent-that
the statute restricted the right to contract for services for reasonable
compensation. And we must determine whether thus construed, and in
the absence of any emergency, the statute necessarily conflicts with
the Fourteenth Amendment. . . The public has no direct, immediate
interest in the agency contract here set up. Its concern is with rates.
Like any other expense item brokers' commissions may ultimately
affect the rate charged for policies; but this is true of the wages of
office boys, printers, bookkeepers, actuaries, officers; the price paid
for pens, ink, or other supplies-indeed whatever expense may be
incurred. Broadly speaking the funds of an insurance company come
from premiums collected; and necessarily all disbursements are made
therefrom and therefore in some sense may be said to affect the
necessary rate of charge. . .Even if it be admitted that the power of
the legislature to establish reasonable rates for insurance necessarily
presupposes existence of the right to command or inhibit what is
essential to the accomplishment of that end, certainly this implied
right extends to nothing which does not clearly appear to be necessary
for such purpose. The statute under review does not prescribe a
schedule of rates or point out the basis for determination of reasonable
rates; it leaves with each company the primary right and duty of
deciding upon rates to be demanded. But it inhibits payment to any
agent, irrespective of the worth of his services and without regard to
any contract with him, of anything in excess of what may be actually
paid to another agent. As construed, it declares that the. smallest
compensation voluntarily paid to any agent shall thereby become
reasonable for every other agent. And it permits an agent who has
been paid according to his agreement to recover more if he can show
that some other agent has received greater compensation. The objections to the statute, no extra ordinary conditions having been disclosed
by the defendant, should be obvious. It goes far beyond the mere
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regulation of the business of insurance and interferes directly with
the right of insurers to control the conduct of their internal affairs;
it restricts the right of both company and agent to make reasonable
private agreements in respect of compensation for ordinary servires;
and the restrictions have no immediate or necessary relation to the
maintenance of insurance rates fair to the public."-O'Gorman vs.
Hartford Co., 51 Sup. Ct. Rep. 130.

CAN SUCH THINGS BE?
We reprint the following editorial from the American Bar Association Journal because we have known for a long time that lawyers
were on the "sucker lists" of various concerns throu'ghout the country;
we've known it, because we were, apparently, listed as one of the
"suckers":
"The lawyer when acting for a client examines every business
proposition with especial care. He is particularly alive to suggestions
of fraud. He does not pay much attention to the unsupported statements of strangers. He is from Missouri. Thus he waxes fat in
practice and in public confidence and his clients rise up and call
him blessed.
"The picture perhaps is not overdrawn with reference to the
great majority of lawyers. But there are evidences not a few that
when dealing with matters of mere personal concern the description
does not fit. The complaints that are privately heard from time to
time from lawyers who have been induced by smooth agents to
subscribe to some fly-by-night 'law list', without the slightest assurance
that it is even regarded as a reputable concern in its class, give evidence
that undue credulity still flourishes in unsuspected quarters where the
lawyer's sense of the guardianship of clients' interests is not summoned
to his aid. The word 'sucker' has a most unpleasant and undignified.
sound, and,-so far as we know, has not yet received a final and definite
judicial construction. Hence, we do not use it in this connection,
although the temptation to do so is naturally very strong.
"We are not speaking of those well known and long established
legal directories, which perform a different function and serve a real
need, but it is estimated that there are from 125 to i5o of these 'law
lists' being operated in the country, of which quite a number are pure
and unadulterated frauds. They flourish because the lawyer is taken
in by the representations of the solicitor, which he apparently accepts at
face value, without investigation, and does not take the trouble to
look into the proposition until he has parted with his money and finds
he has gotten nothing in return. Sometimes the solicitor bolsters his
sales talk with a recommendation on a reproduction of a'letterhead of
some well known law firm, and the victim takes that-also without
investigation as to whether the recommendation is genuine and the
use of the letterhead authorized-as 'confirmation strong as proof of
Holy Writ.'
"Here are the words of one who has recently looked into 'the
waysthat are dark and the tricks that are vain' of some of these flyby-night law lists: 'A lawyer who would not buy a dime's worth of
corporate stock without careful investigation will give up two hundred
and fifty or three hundred or five hundred dollars to a man he never
saw before on the strength of a lot of glib statements of what he will

